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OREIGN POLICY 

Reports 


The Reconstruction of 
Liberia 


August 3, 1932 
Vol VIII, No. 11 


25f 

a copy 

FOREIGN 


a year 

POLICY ASSOCIATION 


Published Fortnightly 
by the 


INCORPORATED 

EIGHTEEN EAST FORTY-FIRST STREET 
NEW VORK, N.Y 









The Reconstruction of Liberia 

by 

Raymond Leslie Buell 

with the aid of the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association 


TABLE OF CONTENTS page 

Introduction . 120 

International Receivership, 1912 . 121 

The Firestone Agreements of 1926 ... 121 

The Forced Labor Investigation. 124 

Firestone’s Labor Policy . 125 

Introduction of Reforms . 126 

Change in American Policy. 128 

The League and Reconstruction. 128 

The Brunot Report ... 129 

Liberia’s Counter-Proposal .-. 129 

Plan of the League Committee. 130 

Proposed Revision of Firestone Contracts. 131 

Criticism of the League Proposal . 132 

American Reservation ...«... 132 

The Possibility of Intervention . 133 

Conclusion . 134 


INTRODUCTION 


F OLLOWING the revelations of the Inter¬ 
national Commission of Inquiry concern¬ 
ing forced labor, which were published in 
January 1931, the Liberian government re¬ 
quested administrative assistance from the 
League of Nations in regard to a program 
of reforms. After a year and a half of study 
and negotiation, the League Council pre¬ 
sented a proposal to Liberia at its May ses¬ 
sion. If Liberia approves this project in 
principle, negotiations are to take place dur¬ 
ing August between the Liberian govern¬ 
ment and a Council Committee. Should these 
negotiations fail, it is possible, according to 
some observers, that Liberia will be the 
scene of revolt and disintegration, or inter¬ 
vention by the United States or a European 


power. Other observers state, however, that 
it is hardly conceivable that the Liberian 
government, having invited assistance from 
the League, would unconditionally reject a 
proposal which is the outcome of arduous 
labor by some of the leading statesmen of 
the world. Nevertheless, at the present writ¬ 
ing the attitude of the Liberian government, 
the American State Department, and the 
Firestone interests toward the League pro¬ 
posal is not definitely known. If these efforts 
toward reconstruction end in failure, the re¬ 
sult might be worse than if no investigation 
into Liberian affairs had ever taken place. 

Liberia, founded in tropical West Africa 
in 1821 as a home for freed slaves, adopted 
in 1847 a constitution modeled on that of the 


Foreign Policy Reports, Vol. VIII, No. 11, August 3, 1932 

Published bi-weekly by the FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION. Incorporated, 18 East 41st Street, New Tork, N. Y„ U. S. A. 
James G. McDonald, Chairman; Raymond Leslie Buell, Research Director and Editor; William T. Stone, Washington Repre¬ 
sentative ; Helen Terry, Assistant Editor; Elizabeth Batterham, Secretary of the Research Department. Research Associates: 
T. A. Bisson, Vera Micheles Dean. Mabel S. Ingalls, Helen H. Moorhead, Ona K. D. Rjngwood, Maxwell S. Stewart. M. S. 
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August 3, 1932 


121 


United States. Liberians estimate that about 
70,000 English-speaking “civilized” descend¬ 
ants of these Negroes, called Americo- 
Liberians, are found along the coast; the 
vast majority of the population, numbering 
1,500,000, consists of “uncivilized” native 
peoples, such as the Mandingos, Krus and 
Golas. Since most of the population is prim¬ 
itive and illiterate, the government has been 
in the hands of the Americo-Liberians. A 
gradual process of amalgamation between 
the “native” and “civilized” elements, how¬ 
ever, is taking place. 1 2 

INTERNATIONAL 
RECEIVERSHIP, 1912 

From the outset the governing class in 
Monrovia, the capital of Liberia, has experi¬ 
enced difficulties in administering the tribes 
in the hinterland and in warding off the en¬ 
croachments of France and England. Large¬ 
ly in order to prevent Liberia from becoming 
a British protectorate, the American govern¬ 
ment in 1912 brought about a loan agree¬ 
ment between Liberia and a group of foreign 
bankers, providing for a 5-per-cent forty- 
year loan of $1,700,000. Virtually all the 
proceeds of this loan were used to pay pre¬ 
vious British loans and internal claims. As 
a guarantee that Liberia would meet interest 
charges and that the country would not fall 
into the hands of any single power, the loan 
agreement provided that the Liberian cus¬ 
toms should be collected by a General Re¬ 
ceiver, “designated” by the United States, 
and by three receivers named by the British, 
German and French governments. The 
agreement also authorized the United States 
to nominate military officers to drill the Li¬ 
beria Frontier Force, a local constabulary. 

A revolt of the Kru tribe in 1915 might 
have led to intervention by France and Great 
Britain but for the arrival of the United 
States warship Chester, bringing 500 Krag 
carbines and 2,500 rounds of ammunition 
purchased by Liberia from the American 
War Department. With this aid, the Liberi¬ 
an government ended the revolt by executing 
72 Kru Chiefs. 3 * * Charging that the govern¬ 
ment had failed to carry out the proposed 
reforms, the American Receiver-General re¬ 
signed. On April 4, 1917 the State Depart¬ 
ment wrote that “unless the Liberian Gov¬ 
ernment proceed without delay to act upon 
the advice and suggestions herewith ex¬ 
pressed, this Government will be forced, 
regretfully to withdraw the friendly support 
that historic and other considerations have 
hitherto prompted it to extend.” 2a Subse¬ 


1. Cf. R. L. Buell, The Native Problem in Africa (New 
York, Macmillan, 1928), Vol. II, p. 749. This figure of 70,000 
includes those who have intermarried with native stock. 

2. Cf. League of Nations, report of W. H. Travell on the 

1931 revolution, C.485.1932.VII. 

2a. United States, Foreign Relations, 1017 , p. 877, 884; cf. 

also, ibid.j 1918j p. 505, et seq. 


quently the American Minister, Mr. James 
L. Curtis, reported that the Liberian legisla¬ 
ture had accepted most of the recommenda¬ 
tions. 

Owing in part to conditions created by the 
World War, the financial situation of Li¬ 
beria steadily deteriorated. The government 
soon became heavily indebted to the local 
branch of the Bank of British West Africa. 
In order to protect its interests this institu¬ 
tion proposed an agreement with the govern¬ 
ment which would give it a share in the in¬ 
ternal administration of the country. To es¬ 
cape from the possible consequences of such 
an agreement, President Howard appealed 
to the United States for a loan in January 
1918 offering to accept the services of Amer¬ 
icans in the administration. On June 1, Sec¬ 
retary Lansing wrote Secretary McAdoo re¬ 
questing financial aid for Liberia on the 
ground that “the Government of the United 
States should alone assume responsibility for 
the conduct of the affairs of the Republic.” 8 
On July 11, the State Department reinforced 
its appeal by stating that unless the United 
States advanced this aid there was “danger 
of Great Britain obtaining a predominant 
control of the country” through the British 
bank. As a result of these appeals, the 
United States Treasury established a credit 
of $5,000,000 in favor of Liberia in Septem¬ 
ber 1918 under the authority of a Liberty 
Loan Act. This credit was made contingent 
on a program of reforms. In October 1921 
the two governments signed an agreement 
providing that in return for this loan an 
American commission of 22 members should 
administer the financial, native and military 
affairs of the republic. Although the Liberi¬ 
an government accepted this agreement, it 
failed of approval in the United States 
Senate. 

THE FIRESTONE 
AGREEMENTS OF 1926 

Another effort at reconstruction came with 
the conclusion of the two Firestone agree¬ 
ments of 1926. 3a In the concession agreement 
approved on November 18, 1926, the Liberi¬ 
an government leased to the Firestone Plan¬ 
tations Company one million acres of rubber 
land for 99 years at an annual rental of 6 
cents for each acre actually under develop¬ 
ment. Six years after the concession agree¬ 
ment had entered into effect the Firestone 
Company was to pay a one-per-cent rubber 
export tax. By the loan agreement of Sep- 


3. United States, Foreign Relations, 1918 t p. 511, 522, 526. 

3a. There were two other agreements, the first of which trans¬ 
ferred to the Firestone interests the Mount Barclay rubber 
plantation, while the second obligated Firestone to construct 
a harbor, subject to reimbursement by the Liberian govern¬ 
ment. The harbor, however, has not been constructed. 









122 


The Reconstruction of Liberia 


tember 1, 1926/ the Finance Corporation, a 
Firestone subsidiary, undertook to make 
Liberia a forty-year loan of $5,000,000 
at 7 per cent. The loan agreement obliged 
Liberia to use half of this loan largely to 
refund the 1912 5-per-cent loan — then 
amounting to $1,185,000—which would ex¬ 
pire in 1952, together with many internal 
claims; and the Finance Corporation agreed 
to purchase bonds immediately to the extent 
of $2,500,000 at a price of 90. The second 
half of the loan was to be issued only when 
the annual customs and head-monies receipts 
reached $800,000 for two consecutive years. 

The 1926 loan agreement displaced the 
international receivership established in 1912 
in favor of exclusive American control. The 
Liberian government agreed that the organi¬ 
zation of the customs and internal revenue 
administration should be supervised by an 
American financial adviser, a supervisor of 
customs, a supervisor of internal revenue, an 
auditor, and an assistant auditor; these offi¬ 
cials, together with the two American offi¬ 
cers of the Frontier Force, were to serve at 
a combined maximum salary of $52,500. For 
twenty years the Liberian government was 
to make no refunding loan except with the 
consent of the financial adviser, and there¬ 
after the Finance Corporation was to have 
an option over any new loan; the National 
City Bank of New York was to act as fiscal 
agent. 

Although the Firestone agreements were 
praised, not only by President King but by a 
number of Americans, as providing a means 
for the rehabilitation of Liberia/ they were 
criticized at the time on the ground that the 
rubber concession did not adequately safe¬ 
guard native land and labor, and that the 
loan agreement increased Liberia’s loan 
charges for unproductive purposes. It was 
pointed out that the development of the Fire¬ 
stone project, which called for from 300,000 
to 350,000 laborers, would inevitably lead to 
forced labor, especially in view of the tradi¬ 
tional methods of labor recruiting employed 
by the Liberian government. The power of 
veto over new loans vested in the Finance 
Corporation was also regarded as unusual. 
Despite these criticisms, President King 


4. Mr. Firestone made the rubber concession dependent upon 
the acceptance of the new loan. Although some Liberians un¬ 
derstood that the loan was to come from a non-Flrestone source, 
the Finance Corporation organized to make the loan proved to be 
a Firestone subsidiary. According to the Liberian Secretary of 
State Grimes, this “was a flagrant violation of the undertaking 
assumed when the contract was signed." It is contended, how¬ 
ever, that the Liberian government knew of this relationship 
from the beginning. League of Nations, Minutes of the Ninth 
Meeting, Committee of the Council, C./Liberia/P.V. (1)., p. 11. 

5. Cf. Dr. Thomas Jesse Jones, New York Times, August 

29, 1928; President King’s statement published in a State 

Department Press Release of August 31, 1928; Dr. Richard 
P. Strong, The African Republic and the Belgian Congo (Cam¬ 
bridge, Harvard Univ-ersity Press, 1930), Vol. I, p. 134; and 
James C. Lawrence, The World's Struggle with Rubber (New 
York, Harpers, 1931), p. 59. 


brought pressure on the Liberian legislature 
to accept the agreements, partly in the hope 
that he would thereby secure the support of 
the State Department in a boundary dispute 
with France/ 

In reply to criticisms of the agreements, 
the Firestone interests declared that a large 
concession was necessary to justify the risk 
which their investments involved. Every ef¬ 
fort, they asserted, would be made to protect 
native interests, and the concession would 
not be developed beyond the labor capacity 
of the country—in 1931 less than 10,000 la¬ 
borers were employed. A new loan, in their 
opinion, was necessary to extinguish Euro¬ 
pean rights in Liberia and to prevent the 
Monrovia government from granting com¬ 
peting concessions to foreign concerns which 
would impair the Firestone interests. The 
whole development, it was added, was de¬ 
signed to free the United States from de¬ 
pendence on the British rubber “monopoly”;’ 
moreover, the new interest rate of 7 per cent 
was not excessive in view of the terms of 
other foreign loans. 

The control established over Liberia by the 
1926 agreement was also criticized on two 
grounds. First it w>as declared that the 
agreement did not vest the loan officials with 
adequate powers. Although the Financial 
Adviser was authorized to devise methods 
for the collection and administration of pub¬ 
lic revenue, it was not clear what authority he 
had to apply the system thus established. If 
he did not approve the current budget, it 
was provided that the budget of the previous 
year should continue in force. This provi¬ 
sion, however, failed to check unwise expen¬ 
diture, owing to the rapid decline in govern¬ 
ment revenue caused by the depression. 
Although the agreement authorized two 
officers to draw up a plan for the reorganiza¬ 
tion of a Frontier Force, it did not bestow 
on them any authority to carry out the plan. 

Secondly, it was declared that the system 
of control was lacking in responsibility. The 
American government assumed the obliga¬ 
tion of “designating” a Financial Adviser to 
Liberia, and, indirectly, other officials, but 
did not assume any responsibility for super¬ 
vising their acts. These persons became of¬ 
ficials of the Liberian government; they were 
expected, however, to control the acts of that 
government. The alleged irresponsible char¬ 
acter of the system was indicated by the fact 
that between September 1926 and January 
1931 neither the State Department, the Na¬ 
tional City Bank of New York, nor the 
American Finance Corporation was willing 
to publish the text of the loan contract. 

6. Cf. Buell, The Native Problem in Africa, cited. 

7. Statement of Harvey Firestone, Sr., New York Times , 
September 2, 1928. 







August 3, 1932 


123 


With the approval of the 1926 agreements 
by Liberia, the Firestone Plantations Com¬ 
pany began planting operations; in addition, 
it undertook an anthropological and forest 
survey, and rendered assistance to certain 
scholars in the preparation of a Kpessee 
grammar. Largely as a result of Firestone 
operations, the imports of Liberia jumped 
from $2,898,081 in 1927 to $4,484,547 in 
1928. In the latter year the excess of im¬ 
ports over exports amounted to $3,018,778. 
In 1929, however, the Firestone Company 
drastically curtailed its activities, apparently 
because of the fall in price of rubber. Ac¬ 
cording to President King, this curtailment 
had had “disastrous consequences” on the 
commercial life of the country. 8 

LIBERIA’S 

FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES 

The 1926 loan apparently was not used 
for productive purposes.* The salary of the 
American Financial Adviser was raised from 
$5,000 to $12,500, the staff of all government 
departments was increased, and the salaries 
of high officials were raised. By 1931 the 
$2,027,700 so far expended—with the excep¬ 
tion of $11,730 for public health and $156,- 
439 for public works—had been used to re¬ 
fund the 1912 loan and to pay off internal 
claims. According to a committee of League 
experts, “the distressing thing” was that 
the $156,000 expended on public works had 
“been squandered as a result of the deplor¬ 
able advice given to the Liberian Republic 
by the Financial Adviser [designated by the 
United States] at that time in office. It is 
generally recognized that what Liberia needs 
is roads; and it is painful to note” that the 
money available was employed for an elec¬ 
tric power plant, a wireless station, presi¬ 
dential pavilions and other structures which 
in the eyes of the experts were of little value. 
“The situation today is that the sums de¬ 
rived from the loan have been spent without 
material advantage, while the annual charge 
represented by the salaries of the American 
advisers, the interest and redemption of the 
loan, etc., remains.” 10 

Even before the economic depression 
struck Liberia, the government had resumed 
its old policy of accumulating a floating debt 
and annually expending more than it re¬ 
ceived. The deficit increased from $61,648 
in 1927-1928 to $220,000 in 1930-1931. “The 
Administration was obviously headed for a 

8. The Annual Message of His Excellency Charles Dunbar 
Burgess King, October SO, 1929 (Monrovia, Government Print¬ 
ing Office, 1929), p. 32. 

9. League of Nations, Report of the experts designated by 
the Committee of the Council of the League of Nations appointed 
to study the problem raised by the Liberian government's request 
for assistance (hereafter cited as Report of the Experts), 
C./Liberia/4 (1)., p. 29. 

10. Ibid. 


collapse,” said the League experts, “which 
would have occurred earlier” except for the 
Firestone investment which created a tem¬ 
porary boom. 

In 1929-1930 the Liberian government and 
the Finance Corporation engaged in a series 
of controversies in which the Corporation 
charged that the government had violated 
the loan contract on six counts, 11 as when it 
ignored the provision authorizing the Fi¬ 
nancial Adviser to apply assigned revenues 
to the loan services. In the course of these 
controversies, the Corporation withheld 
sums still due from the 1926 loan until 
the Liberian government had changed its 
treasury policy; and the Financial Adviser 
failed to approve the 1931 budget. The Li¬ 
berian government, however, contended that 
the dispute with the Corporation involved 
differences over the meaning of the 1926 
agreement which should be settled by arbi¬ 
tration. 

Dissatisfied with the financial policy of 
the government, the British Bank of West 
Africa, the only bank in Monrovia which 
had served as a depositary for the govern¬ 
ment, withdrew from Liberia in December 
1930.“ After vainly attempting to induce 
other banks to enter the country, the Fire¬ 
stone interests set up a bank called the 
United States Trading Company which ar¬ 
ranged to act as the government depositary, 
receiving a commission of 1-1/2 per cent on 
sums deposited with it.“ 

The depression aggravated Liberia's diffi¬ 
culties. In 1930 imports dropped to $1,228,- 
102, but there was still an unfavorable bal¬ 
ance of trade of $389,364. Government rev¬ 
enue declined from $1,276,438 in 1928 to 
$551,306 in 1931. Meanwhile, the annual 
burden of $269,284, representing interest 
charges and salaries of American loan offi¬ 
cials under the 1926 agreement, remained 
fixed. The Liberian government estimated 
that while these charges represented only 20 
per cent of the government revenue in 1928, 
they absorbed 54.9 per cent in 1931“ Liberia 
was consequently forced into default during 
the second half of 1931, and is now greatly 
in arrears on salary payments to Liberians 
but not to American officials. According 
to a League committee, “Liberia’s financial 
situation is tragic [sic]. . . . Economically 
and financially, Liberia is in imminent dan¬ 
ger.” 10 


11. Provisional Report of the Financial Adviser from Octo¬ 
ber 1, 1929 to September 30, 1930. 

12. New York Times, January 11, 1931. 

13. Report of the Experts, cited, p. 28. 

14. League of Nations. Memorandum of the Government of 
Liberia on the Report of the Experts, C./Liberia/13., p. 19. 

15. Report of the Experts, cited, p. 11. 








124 


The Reconstruction of Liberia 


YELLOW FEVER 

The attention of the outside world has re¬ 
cently been directed to Liberia because of the 
appearance of yellow fever and the exist¬ 
ence of forced labor and slavery. Yellow 
fever first made its appearance in Liberia 
in 1929 and resulted in the death, among 
others, of the American Minister, Mr. Fran¬ 
cis, and Mr. James L. Sibley, educational ad¬ 
viser representing a number of American 
educational, missionary and philanthropic 
societies.” Yellow fever had previously ap¬ 
peared in other parts of West Africa, but 
had been placed under control by government 
health services and quarantines. In Liberia, 
however, the government possessed "no 
health service of any kind.” According to a 
League investigation, 

. . the absence of any attempt by the Liberian 

Government not only to take effective steps to 


control yellow fever or plague, but even to ar¬ 
range for the notification of yellow fever, as well 
as the complete lack of medical supervision of 
ships touching the Liberian coast, constitutes a 
grave international danger, which is particularly 
regrettable at a time when energetic measures 
are being taken against yellow fever in all the 
other countries of the West Coast of Africa. ,m 

The country was also faced with the dan¬ 
ger of introduction of the plague, which 
would entail “complete catastrophe for the 
population,” as well as by the spread of yel¬ 
low fever and tuberculosis into the interior. 
Largely as a result of the work of Dr. How¬ 
ells, loaned by the British government, and 
of Dr. Fuszek, appointed director of sanita¬ 
tion by President Barclay, the health situa¬ 
tion improved. Dr. Fuszek's work, however, 
was hampered by a shortage of funds.” No 
authentic cases of yellow fever have been re¬ 
ported in Liberia since 1929. 


THE FORCED LABOR INVESTIGATION 


For a number of years reports had been 
published alleging conditions of slavery and 
forced labor in Liberia; the charge, how¬ 
ever, was denied not only by Liberia but 
also by the American State Department.” 
Finally, on June 8, 1929, the State Depart¬ 
ment sent a note to Liberia, calling attention 
to charges concerning the export of labor 
from Liberia to the Spanish island of Fer¬ 
nando Po “which seemed hardly distinguish¬ 
able from organized slave trade.” Although 
Liberia made a “solemn and categorical deni¬ 
al” of such charges,® it agreed to establish an 
international commission of investigation, 
one member being appointed by the United 
States, one by the League Council, and one 
by the Liberian government. This invita¬ 
tion was accepted by the League Council and 
the United States. The commission—con¬ 
sisting of the League representative, Dr. 
Cuthbert Christy, who served as chairman, 
Dr. Charles S. Johnson, Negro professor at 
Fiske University, representing the United 
States, and former President Barclay of 
Liberia—was constituted in Monrovia on 
April 7, 1930. Following an exhaustive in¬ 
vestigation, the commission on September 
8 completed its report, which was published 
simultaneously by the League and the State 
Department in January 1931.“ 

The’ commission reported the existence of 


16. Strong. The African Republic of Liberia and the Belgian 
Congo, cited, Vol. I, p. 233. In December 1931 American edu¬ 
cational and philanthropic societies announced, the establish¬ 
ment in Liberia of the Booker Washington Agricultural and 
Industrial Institute, with an endowment fund of $100,000. 
(New York Times, December 20, 1931.) 

17. Report of the Experts, cited, p. 8. 

18. League of Nations, Memorandum of the Government of 
Liberia on the Report of the Experts, cited; also “Report of 
the Council Committee on Liberia,” Official Journal, March 1932, 
p. 624. 

19. Acting Secretary Castle, New York Herald Tribune, Au¬ 
gust 31, 1928. 


the practice of “pawning,” which was con¬ 
trary to the terms of the 1926 slavery con¬ 
vention to which Liberia was a party. By 
this practice a parent or guardian, in return 
for a loan of money, would “pawn” his child 
for an indefinite period. In some cases 
“pawns” were held in servitude for as long 
as 40 years. 

Secondly, the commission reported that a 
condition of forced labor existed in connec¬ 
tion with recruiting for Fernando Po. The 
Spanish cocoa planters of this island, un¬ 
able to find an adequate local supply, had for 
many years recruited labor in Liberia. In 
1928 they entered into an agreement with a 
number of Liberians, some of whom were 
officials and relatives of President King, 
agreeing to pay $45 per boy for each group 
of 3,000 boys exported, plus a bonus of 
$5,000 for every additional group of 1,500 
boys.® The commission declared that, hav¬ 
ing this financial incentive, Liberian officials, 
including Vice President Yancy, sent soldiers 
of the Frontier Force to “catch” boys. When 
the chiefs failed to supply the number of men 
demanded, they were fined excessive sums, 

20. Note of June 11, 1929. In its note of November 17. 
1930, the United States declared that this inquiry was agreed 
to “with extreme reluctance” by the Liberian government. 

21. United States, Report of the International Commission of 
Inquirg into the Existence of Slavery and Forced Labor in the 
Republic of Liberia (hereafter cited as Report of International 
Commission of Inquiry), Publications of the Department of 
State No. 147; also League of Nations, Report of International 
Commission of Enquiry in Liberia, C.658.M.272.1930.VI. Dur¬ 
ing the investigation there was circulated what purported to 
be State Department instructions to Dr. Johnson, declaring, 
among other things, that the British and French governments 
wished to have Liberia placed under a League mandate. The 
American government pronounced the documents forgeries, and 
pointed out that they were couched in language entirely foreign 
to that used by the United States. Cf. the statement of June 
28, 1930 issued by the Liberian State Department, also The 
Spark, July, 1930. 

22. United States, Report of International Commission of 
Inquiry, cited, p. 68, 171. 











August 3, 1932 


125 


and in some cases actually flogged before 
their own people by native soldiers or of¬ 
ficials. 

Thirdly, the commission found that the 
Liberian government had compelled natives 
to labor on a program of road construction 
which it had inadvisedly adopted without the 
aid of adequate surveyors or engineers. Na¬ 
tive chiefs had been required to provide labor 
for this construction, and in addition had 
been obliged to furnish the laborers with 
food and tools. The men were invariably 
forced to work without pay, and both men 
and women laborers had frequently been 
subjected to cruel treatment. Many natives 
exhibited to the commission the bruises and 
scars they had received from government 
overseers; in addition to being flogged, some 
natives had been tortured by being strung 
up to the rafters of a hut and literally 
smoked over a fire. Others had been sub¬ 
jected to “basket punishment,” by which an 
immense basket, filled with earth and heavy 
stones, was lifted by four soldiers and placed 
upon the head of the prisoner, who was then 
required to walk. Usually the basket was 
so heavy that it either immediately broke 
the native’s neck, or caused such injury that 
he later died. 

FIRESTONE’S LABOR POLICY 

Finally, the commission investigated the 
question of whether the labor employed by 
the Firestone rubber plantation, the only 
large foreign enterprise in the country, was 
recruited by force. The commission found 
that the Firestone project 

“. . . represents a vast and somewhat bold ex¬ 
periment in rubber growing. . . The precipitous 
character of the company’s pioneering operations 
in Liberia, the unfamiliarity of its employees with 
African conditions, the unsuitableness of its 
equipment and outfit, and the inexperience in the 
control of primitive labor all created difficulties 
which it took many months to get in front of.. 

The commission found that until the end of 
1927 the Firestone company secured about 
10 per cent of its laborers from government 
sources,” but that at present “there is no 
evidence that the Firestone Plantations Com¬ 
pany consciously employs any but voluntary 
labor.” It pointed out, moreover, that only 
55,000 acres of the concession had been de- 

23. The commission produced evidence to show that such 
labor was compulsorily recruited. United States, Report of 
International Commission of Inquiry, cited, p. 125, et seq. In 
1926, however, the Firestone company proposed a "supplemen¬ 
tary interpretation” of the labor provisions of the 1926 con¬ 
cession to the effect that it should be free to bargain with 
labor, without recourse to the government. The latter appar¬ 
ently had wished to participate in the recruiting to prevent 
natives from believing that the Firestone company was not 
under government control. 

24. Cf., however, the testimony of Secretary of State Grimes 
in 1932. League of Nations, Minutes of the 8th Meeting, Janu¬ 
ary 27, 1932, Council Committee on Liberia; cf. also remarks 
of M. Brunot, Minutes of the 11th Meeting, and of M. Sottile, 
Minutes of the 12th Meeting, February 1, 1932. For the charges 
of a number of native chiefs that the government had allowed 
the Firestone company to occupy land owned by natives, cf. 
The Voice of the People (Monrovia), October 1931. 


veloped and that present operations required 
only about 10,000 men. Workers were free 
to leave the plantation at will. 2 * 

In making recommendations for reform, 
the commission declared that the whole pol¬ 
icy of the government toward the hinterland 
natives should be revised. 

“Intimidation has apparently been and is the 
keyword of the Government’s policy. Not only 
have the native village classes been intimidated 
and terrorized by a display of force, cruelty, and 
suppression, but the chiefs themselves, men whom 
the people not so many years ago looked up to, 
were glad to serve and relied upon for protec¬ 
tion, harsh though it sometimes was; men who 
never moved without a retinue and barbaric dis¬ 
play of pomp have been so systematically humili¬ 
ated, degraded and robbed of their power that 
now they are mere go-betweens, paid by the Gov¬ 
ernment to coerce and rob the people.” 25 

Apparently believing that the elimination 
of forced labor depended on the fundamental 
social reorganization of the country, the com¬ 
mission recommended that the policy of hu¬ 
miliating the chiefs should cease, and that 
their tribal authority should be restored. It 
asked that European or American native 
commissioners be appointed; pawning abol¬ 
ished; the road program curtailed; the ship¬ 
ment of laborers to Fernando Po stopped; 
the Frontier Force reorganized; and Ameri¬ 
can immigration encouraged. 

No longer able to deny the existence of 
forced labor, President King on September 
30, 1930 informed the United States that 
he had accepted the recommendations of the 
Christy report.* On October 1 he issued 
decrees prohibiting the further export of 
labor and making “pawns” illegal, and on 
October 30 submitted the report to the legis¬ 
lature for its action. 

After reading the report, Secretary Stim- 
son sent a note which reached Liberia on 
November 5, 1930, declaring that the United 
States was “profoundly shocked” at the 
Christy revelations. The prestige of Liberia 
depended upon the “sincerity and effective¬ 
ness with which it puts promptly into exe¬ 
cution the reform measures to which it 
stands solemnly committed.”” 

RESIGNATION OF 
PRESIDENT KING 

The Liberian legislature, while not neces¬ 
sarily opposed to reforms, was indignant 
with President King. Many Liberians be¬ 
lieved that he was a catspaw of the State 


25. United States, Report of the Commission of Inquiry, 
cited, p. 140. 

26. The report was submitted to the Liberian government on 
September 8, 1930, to the State Department on October 21, and 
to the League Council on December 15. 

27. League of Nations, Official Journal, February 1931, 
p. 467. The United States transmitted the notes of November 
5 and November 17, 1930 to the League Secretariat for the 
information of the parties to the anti-slavery convention of 
1926, to which the United States was a party. The League 
Council communicated the Christy report to the Assembly as 
one of the documents annually submitted in accordance with 
the 1926 convention. League of Nations, Official Journal, Feb¬ 
ruary 1931, p. 219. 








126 


The Reconstruction op Liberia 


Department and the Firestone interests, and 
that except for his policies the country would 
have been left alone. The attitude of the 
legislature led Washington to send a second 
note on November 17, in which the State De¬ 
partment declared that despite promise of 
reforms the Liberian government 

. . has failed to submit definite plans for 
their execution . . . Ten weeks have now elapsed 
since the formal submission of the report to the 
Liberian Government. The American Govern¬ 
ment understands that not only has no action 
been taken against the officials whose guilt was 
established therein, but apparently all of these 
officials continue to hold public office . . . Unless 
there is instituted by the Liberian Government a 
comprehensive system of reforms, loyally and 
sincerely put into effect, it will result in the final 
alienation of the friendly feelings which the 
American Government and people have enter¬ 
tained for Liberia since its establishment nearly 
a century ago.” 

On December 2 a special committee of the 
Liberian legislature presented a report rec¬ 
ommending the prosecution of a number of 
officials implicated by the Christy report, 
the impeachment of Vice President Yancy, 
and the resignation of President King in 
favor of Secretary of State Edwin Barclay. 
Nevertheless, the committee wished “to have 
it understood that it had not yet taken into 
consideration the Christy recommendations.” 
Mr. King resigned. The American note of 
November 17 was received during the inter¬ 
im between his resignation and Barclay’s in¬ 
duction on December 3 as Acting Presi¬ 
dent. 28 In his annual message, Barclay de¬ 
clared that in view of the legislature’s atti¬ 
tude, it was “impossible to confirm President 
King’s commitments. . .No coerced admis¬ 
sion of failure and incompetency” should 
lead to the voluntary surrender of Liberia’s 
independence. 22 In the presidential elections 
of May 1931, Mr. Barclay, as the candidate 
of the Whig party, won a victory over Mr. 
Thomas J. Faulkner, the candidate of the 
People’s party, who had come to the United 
States in 1929 to demand an investigation 
in Liberia. The opposition charged that Mr. 
Barclay unfairly controlled the election—a 
charge which was denied. Neither the Amer¬ 
ican nor the British government, however, 
has recognized Barclay as President. 35 


28. Dr. Christy states that King’s resignation was "brought 
about by his political opponents in Monrovia and not at the 
instigation of the United States Government.” ("Liberia in 
1930,” Royal Geographical Society, June 1930. Cf. also League 
of Nations, Memorandum of the Government of Liberia on the 
Report of the Experts, cited, p. 3.) 

29. The Annual Message of President Edwin Barclay, De¬ 
cember 22, 1931 (Monrovia, Government Printing Office, 1931). 

30. On July 8, 1930 the People’s party of Montserrado County 
requested the assistance of the United States and the League 
of Nations in removing the King administration and estab¬ 
lishing a provisional government until the next presidential 
election, which they requested should be supervised by a com¬ 
mission consisting of three members—one named by each party 
and one by the League and the United States. Another mass 
meeting, however, denounced this invitation of foreign inter¬ 
vention. (Cf. The Matronal Echo, Monrovia, July 1930.) In 


INTRODUCTION OF REFORMS 

Following Barclay’s accession, the Liberi¬ 
an legislature enacted laws prohibiting the 
exportation of contract labor, providing 
for the reorganization of the hinterland and 
opening it to trade, prohibiting pawning, 
and creating a public health service. More¬ 
over, proceedings were taken against the 
Secretary of the Interior and a number of 
commissioners. The government also asked 
the United States to nominate experts to 
supervise the health service and to work in 
the interior administration. The United 
States did not reply to this request, appar¬ 
ently preferring to await the action of the 
League. 31 

On December 15, 1930 the Barclay gov¬ 
ernment presented the Christy report to the 
League, declaring that it would “take ac¬ 
count,” as far as possible, of the Christy 
recommendations, 32 that reforms had already 
been made, and that every effort to wipe out 
forced labor would be undertaken. It stated, 
however, that it was difficult to eradicate 
immemorial customs and that on certain Af¬ 
rican tribes compulsory labor seemed to have 
an educational effect. It asserted that the 
Christy commission had learned only iso¬ 
lated facts, chiefly referring to the period 
1919 to 1928; that many witnesses had been 
inspired by political motives; and that Li¬ 
beria should receive credit for being the first 
government freely to accept an international 
{inquiry. 33 It was common knowledge, it 
added, that “in other countries than Liberia 
forced labor is in full force.” 

In his presidential message of December 
22, 1931, President Barclay declared that 
the prompt measures taken to remedy the 
conditions described in the Christy report 
had been so effective that he was gratified 
to “report the complete eradication from our 
social life of the pawn system and of every 
other condition which by any strength of 
interpretation or imagination may be con¬ 
sidered as analogous to slavery or involun¬ 
tary servitude.” In support of this view, he 
quoted a report of one of the American loan 
officials, Mr. Travell, who declared that the 
abolition of pawning had caused certain dis¬ 
satisfaction among the hinterland tribes and 
that the abolition of compulsory porterage 
had made it extremely difficult for officials 
to obtain carriers. 34 


an agreement between the "Whig and People’s parties, but the 
proposal apparently was not considered by President Barclay, 
the fall of 1931, it was reported that M. Sottile had proposed 
(Cf. The Voice of the People, Monrovia, October 1931.) 

31. It had sent Dr. Smith to Liberia, however, to attack the 
problem of yellow fever. 

32. Submitted to the Council January 22, 1931, Official Jour¬ 
nal, February 1931, p. 463; cf. also the Liberia note of January 
9, 1931, ibid., p. 466. 

33. Cf. M. A. Sottile’s remarks at the Council. Ibid., p. 190. 

34. The Annual Message of President Barclay, 1931, cited, 

p. 16. 









August 3, 1932 


127 


ALLEGED REPRISALS 

Charges that the Liberian government had 
punished native witnesses who gave testi¬ 
mony against it were made not only by the 
Christy commission, but by the American 
State Department and M. Brunot, chairman 
of the second League committee. 35 Secretary 
of State Grimes emphatically denied the 
charges of reprisals. Viscount Cecil, chair¬ 
man of the Council’s Liberia committee, 
pointed out that if these charges were true, 
the League of Nations would be justified in 
deeply resenting reprisals, “for the honour of 
the League was at stake.” 35 

The Kru Revolt 

On January 30, representatives of the 
American, British and French governments 
informed the League’s Liberia committee 
that the Monrovia government had taken re¬ 
pressive measures against the Krus,” and 
on March 7 these same governments are re¬ 
ported to have protested against the “mas¬ 
sacre” of between 400 and 600 unarmed men, 
women and children on the Kru coast on 
December 11, 1931 by way of reprisal be¬ 
cause of testimony before the Christy com¬ 
mission. 88 

On March 14 these three governments sent 
a special agent, Mr. Rydings, British Vice- 
Consul at Monrovia, to the Kru coast to 
investigate the situation, and a week later 
the Barclay government sent a commission 
of inquiry, consisting of Mr. Travell, an 
American loan official, and two Liberians. 
The three reports resulting from these in¬ 
quiries—Mr. Travell published a minority 
report—were published at Geneva in May 
1932* 

These reports indicate that the Barclay 
government employed force not by w r ay of 
reprisals against natives who had testified 
before the Christy commission—that body 
did not visit this area—but in order to sup¬ 
press a revolution. 40 This revolt was caused 

35. League of Nations, International Commission of En¬ 
quiry, p. 205; also American Memorandum of November 17- 
December 1, Official Journal, February 1931, p. 468 ; Minutes of 
the 7th meeting, Committee of the Council, C./Liberia/P.V. 7 1 ; 
also the Liberian letter of January 1931, Official Journal, Feb¬ 
ruary 1931, p. 469. 

36. League of Nations, Affuutes of the 7th Meeting ; cf. also 
the Council discussion of February 6, 1932, Official Journal. 
March 1932, p. 526. 

37. League of Nations, Minutes of the 11th Meeting, C./Li- 
beria./P.V.ll (1) ; cf. also remarks of M. Brunot, Minutes of the 
7th Meeting. 

38. The text of the protest was not published, but it is sum¬ 
marized In President Barclay’s letter of March 21, 1932 to the 
investigating commission. League of Nations, C.485.1932.VII. 
Cf. also Afro-American (Baltimore), March 19, 23, 1932; Mew 
York Times, March 16, 1932 ; Christian Science Monitor, March 
16, 1932 ; United States Daily, March 28, 1932. 

39. For the Rydings report, cf. League of Nations, C.486.- 
1932.VII, cited; for the two reports of the Liberian commission, 
cf. C.482.1932.VII. and C.4S5.1932.VII. 

40. Mr. Rydings reported, however, that any native who 
openly expressed a preference for white rule was held to be 
guilty of sedition and confined. It was also charged that 
Liberians who raised funds to send representatives to present 
the case of the opposition at Geneva were arrested on charges 
of sedition. Cf. Afro-American, November 28, 1931. 


by long-standing discontent, inflamed by 
false hopes aroused by the Christy investiga¬ 
tion. In the wake of this investigation un¬ 
scrupulous Liberians had told the Krus that 
the w r hite man was going to take over the 
country and that natives need pay no fur¬ 
ther taxes. In order to settle outstanding 
disputes and reestablish the authority of the 
government, President Barclay instructed 
Colonel Davis of the Frontier Force to pro¬ 
ceed to the Kru coast in May 1931. The 
President issued strict instructions against 
initiating aggressive action and looting. Ac¬ 
cording to Mr. Travell, “Colonel Davis was 
indeed patient, and for a period of almost 
ten weeks he wrote many letters to the de¬ 
fiant tribes, and restrained his soldiers. . . ” 
Up to the beginning of hostilities, “the ac¬ 
tivities of Colonel Davis on the Kru coast 
was [sic] characterized by great caution, 
humanity and a desire to avoid conflict.” 
Nevertheless, fighting finally broke out on 
November 10, 1931, following the refusal of 
Chief Nimley to surrender his arms. The 
reports agreed that instead of 600 “un¬ 
armed” people being killed, the number of 
casualties did not exceed 170, among whom 
some non-combatants were included. It was 
reported, however, that in the fighting the 
Frontier Force burned down about 40 native 
villages, as a result of which between 12,000 
and 15,000 natives had fled to the bush where 
they continued to defy government authority. 
Although the Liberian commissioners con¬ 
tended that the burning of towns was a mili¬ 
tary necessity and that the campaign was 
conducted with restraint, Mr. Travell did 
not entirely agree with this statement, while 
Mr. Rydings declared that the military op¬ 
erations had been conducted in a “ruthless, 
callous and brutal manner.” The Bar¬ 
clay government, for its part, declared 
that “against these various subversive 
movements, swelling in volume and increas¬ 
ing in violence as the days went by, the Gov¬ 
ernment found itself obliged to take drastic 
action; for no Government, unless intent on 
abdicating, can sit with folded hands while 
its agents are outraged, its lawful dues with¬ 
held, its authority disregarded and its laws 
defied.” 41 It expressed surprise that Great 
Britain and France, which had frequently 
been obliged to suppress revolts in their 
colonial territory, should protest against the 
efforts of the Liberian government to main¬ 
tain peace and order. 

While this investigation did not substan¬ 
tiate the sweeping charges allegedly made by 
the three governments on March 7, it re¬ 
vealed that the authority of the Liberian 
government over the Kru coast had been 
severely shaken. Consequently the League 


41. League of Nations, C./Liberia/19., p. 2. 








128 


The Reconstruction op Liberia 


Council, in agreement with the Liberian gov¬ 
ernment, dispatched a representative to the 
Kru coast in May 1932 to persuade the Krus 
to return to their homes." These incidents 
show that if an international investigation 
of this type does not lead to reprisals, it may 
stimulate a rebellious spirit among disaf¬ 
fected elements unless the authority making 
the investigation imposes provisional pre¬ 
ventive measures. 

CHANGE IN AMERICAN POLICY 

Although in supporting the 1926 contracts 
the State Department seemed to desire to 
establish exclusive American influence over 
Liberia, this attitude was abandoned when 
it accepted the principle of an international 


inquiry in 1929. On January 20,1931, more¬ 
over, the Department declared that 

“While it would not accord with the established 
policy of the United States to assume any ex¬ 
clusive responsibilities on the African continent, 
the American government, in view of the social 
and humanitarian principles involved and the 
traditional friendly interest of the American 
people in the welfare of Liberia, would be pre¬ 
pared to give sympathetic consideration to a pro¬ 
posal for affirmative international cooperation 
destined to assist the Liberian people in a solu¬ 
tion of their present problems concerning both 
slavery and sanitation.”** 

On February 5, 1931 the League receiyed 
a letter from Secretary Stimson, accepting 
an invitation to cooperate with the League 
in a reconstruction program. 


THE LEAGUE AND RECONSTRUCTION 


On January 21, 1931 the representatives 
of the American, British and German gov¬ 
ernments in Monrovia were reported to have 
asked “Mr.” Barclay to accept international 
control.** While declining to accept this pro¬ 
posal on the ground that it would be tanta¬ 
mount to surrendering the sovereignty of 
the country, President Barclay stated that 
Liberia would apply to the League for ad¬ 
visers regarding finance, judicial organiza¬ 
tion, sanitation, and native administration. 

Placed upon the agenda by the British 
government, the Christy report was dis¬ 
cussed by the League Council on January 22, 
1931. At that time, Mr. Sottile, the Italian 
who serves as Liberia’s permanent delegate 
to the League, declared that the application 
of the reforms proposed by the Christy re¬ 
port was handicapped by the fact that Li¬ 
beria “was in the most precarious financial 
situation she had ever known.” Liberia was, 
“financially speaking, a slave [sic] . . . The 
energies of the Liberian people are para¬ 
lyzed—not by the Government of Liberia, 
not by the Liberian people, not by the world 
economic situation, and not by the soil of 
Liberia . . . The cause is due to other fac¬ 
tors. ..”—apparently a reference to the 1926 
contracts.* 5 M. Sottile declared that Liberia 
would consider any League proposal for 
financial assistance. On January 23 he 
wrote that Liberia would be grateful if the 
League, while respecting its sovereign 


42 It was agreed that the Council should advance the ex¬ 
penses of the representative, Dr. Mackenzie, subject to reim¬ 
bursement by the Liberian government, if possible. President 
Barclay agreed to accept the representative, provided he were 
accompanied by a Liberian official, and Dr. Mackenzie pro¬ 
ceeded to Liberia on a British gunboat. Minutes, C./67th Ses- 
aIon/P.V.9 1 , May 20, 21, 1932 ; also New York Times. July 2. 
1932, and Afro-American, July 16, 1932. 

43. Cf. “The Suppression of Slavery,” Geneva Special Studies, 
April 1931, p. 21. 

44. For excerpts from the notes, cf. The Annual Message of 
President Barclay, December 22, 1931, cited, p. 35. 

45. League of Nations, Official Journal, February 1931, p. 
192, 218, 470. 


rights, would offer its administrative assis¬ 
tance with a view to carrying out social and 
public health reforms. On the following 
day the League Council adopted a report 
which suggested that the Liberian govern¬ 
ment ratify the forced labor convention 
adopted by the International Labor Confer¬ 
ence in June 1930—a suggestion which Li¬ 
beria carried out by registering its ratifica¬ 
tion in May 1931.“ The Council also ap¬ 
pointed a committee, consisting of represen¬ 
tatives of the British Empire, France, Ger¬ 
many, Italy, Liberia, Poland, Spain and 
Venezuela, to examine the question of ad¬ 
ministrative assistance in agreement with 
the Liberian government." The Council 
asked the United States to participate in the 
work of this committee, and, accepting the 
invitation, the United States named its 
charge in Monrovia, Samuel Reber, Jr., as 
its representative. 

As a result of the meeting in London from 
February 27 to March 3, 1931 of the Coun¬ 
cil’s Committee on Liberia, it was agreed to 
send a second committee to Liberia to study 
administrative, financial and public health 
questions. The committee consisted of Dr. 
Brunot, former French colonial governor, 
Mr. Ligthart, former director of the “Ja- 
vasche Bank,” and Dr. Mackenzie of the 
Health Section of the League Secretariat. 
The Council Committee also accepted the 
offer of the British government to transfer 
Doctor Howells from a neighboring colony 
to Liberia, as an emergency measure.** 


46. Ibid., July 1931, p. 1421. In its communication of De¬ 
cember 15, 1930, the Liberian government declared that it had 
“accepted” this convention, but it did not deposit its ratification 
until after the Council’s report. Under this convention it will 
be required to submit an annual report. Cf. Article 408, Treaty 
of Versailles; Article 22, Convention on Forced Labor. 

47. By virtue of its replacement of Venezuela on the Coun¬ 
cil, Panama took the place of Venezuela on this Committee, be¬ 
ginning with its sixth meeting on January 25, 1932. 

48. Cf. League of Nations, “Preliminary report of the Com¬ 
mittee of the Council,” Official Journal, July 1931, p. 1448. 








August 3, 1932 


129 


THE BRUNOT REPORT 

On September 25, 1931, after visiting Li¬ 
beria for six weeks, the Brunot committee 
completed its report, which was not pub¬ 
lished, however, until the following May. 
The report declared that it was urgently 
necessary to alleviate the financial and sani¬ 
tary situation, and to restore the confidence 
of the natives in the government, and that 
these ends could be attained only by foreign 
aid. It was questionable, the experts subse¬ 
quently declared, whether the reform meas¬ 
ures of the Liberian government had had 
practical application." The report outlined a 
reconstruction program, based on an accur¬ 
ate map, a census and a mining-agricultural 
survey, which should be undertaken by for¬ 
eign experts. It asked the abolition of all 
compulsory labor except in the case of com¬ 
munal work on roads in tribal territory, and 
stated that the rights of the natives to the 
land and to the product of their labor should 
be guaranteed. Although an improved sys¬ 
tem of education was necessary, no new ef¬ 
fort to tax the tribes for this purpose 
should be made until after the establishment 
of a general system of administration which 
would restore confidence among the natives. 
The committee recommended that the whole 
country be divided into three provinces. 

To carry out a reconstruction program, 
the Brunot committee recommended the en¬ 
gagement of 20 foreigners—three financial 
advisers, a legal and a deputy legal adviser, 
military adviser, eight administrators and 
six medical officers, all of whom should be 
granted the necessary powers by the Liberian 
government. The financial advisers, who 
were to be granted greater authority than 
that enjoyed by the financial adviser under 
the 1926 contract, were to be nominated by 
the League in agreement with the United 
States, which would mean altering the terms 
of the 1926 loan contract." The chief legal 
adviser was to become president of the Li¬ 
beria circuit court, and the jury system was 
to be temporarily suspended. Apparently it 
was believed that, unless foreign control over 
the courts was established, capital could not 
be attracted to the country and the recon¬ 
struction program would be defeated. The 
eight administrators were not only to en¬ 
force the law, but were to have wide judicial 
power in native cases, including the right to 


49. Cf. remarks of M. Brunot, Minutes of the 12th Meeting, 
February 1, 1932. The opposition party, represented in Geneva 
by an aboriginal native, M. Morais, denied that the reforms 
were effective. Cf. Henri A. Junod, La Supplique du Liberia, 
Bureau International pour la Defense des Indigenes, October 
1931, Journal de Genive, October 3, 7, 1931; cf. also the letter 
from fifteen chiefs, complaining of forced labor exactions and 
requisitions, Afro-American, July 16, 1932. 

50. Cf. M. Ligthart’s remarks, Minutes of the 10th Meeting, 
Committee of the Council; also Report by the Experts on Li¬ 
berian Government’s Request for Assistance, cited. 


impose summary penalties for minor of¬ 
fenses.” In the coastal areas, however, Li¬ 
berian administrative officials -were to con¬ 
tinue to exercise authority. The Brunot re¬ 
port insisted that Liberia could recover only 
with the aid of a program “of practical as¬ 
sistance and not merely by advice 

In considering the desirability of revising 
the Firestone contracts, the Brunot commit¬ 
tee expressed the view that while Liberia’s 
future depended on the prosperity of the 
small native cultivator, the development of 
a prosperous industrial plantation was not 
incompatible with this end. The Firestone 
plantation was a great achievement “due to 
the large capital and the really remarkable 
energy and effort displayed.” When the 
plantation became ready for tapping, the 
labor problem would become serious. The 
Firestone company could, however, attract 
the necessary workers by erecting model 
native villages, each having cultivated land 
and the conveniences needed for happy fam¬ 
ily life. Moreover, the rubber contract was 
“very favorable to the lessee.” At the end of 
the next five years the Liberian government 
will probably receive from the rubber ex¬ 
port tax and land rent, only $40,320, “an 
amount which is not sufficient even to pay 
the officials responsible for the service of 
the loan [s?'c].”“ The Committee recom¬ 
mended the conclusion of new agreements 
between the Liberian government and Mr. 
Firestone, providing for a moratorium on 
the 1926 loan, and for the advance in install¬ 
ments by Mr. Firestone of the second half 
of the 1926 loan, amounting to $2,500,000, 
to finance the reconstruction program. Sub¬ 
sequently it suggested that the size of the 
Firestone rubber concession be reduced, and 
the obligation of the Liberian government 
to assist in labor recruiting abolished.” 

LIBERIA’S COUNTER-PROPOSAL 

At the meeting of the League Liberia 
Committee in January 1932, the Liberian 
government stated that since the Brunot re¬ 
port had arrived in Monrovia only in Novem¬ 
ber, it had not had time to examine it care¬ 
fully; it consequently asked that discussion 
be postponed. While agreeing that no de¬ 
cision should be taken until the following 
April, the Liberia committee proceeded nev¬ 
ertheless to a preliminary examination of 
the Brunot report. After criticizing the re¬ 
port on the ground of alleged inaccuracies 
and stating that the committee had exceeded 


51. The system recommended by the committee is similar to 
that of the French ind\g&t\at, and is open to the same criticism. 
Buell, The Native Problem in Africa, cited, Vol. I, p. 1016. 

52. C./Liberia/4, p. 28. 

53. League of Nations, Draft Plan of Assistance, C./Li- 
beria/16, May 14, 1932. 









130 


The Reconstruction of Liberia 


its terms of reference, the Liberian repre¬ 
sentatives, Secretary of State Grimes and 
M. Sottile, declared that it was unconstitu¬ 
tional to concentrate judicial and executive 
authority in the same person, as the Brunot 
report recommended.” Moreover, in a 
memorandum written in August 1931 but 
not published until the following May," 
the Liberian government declared that it 
could not “accept any assistance, plan or sug¬ 
gestion relating to matters other than so¬ 
cial, health or finance reform,” or involving 
political or judicial organization. It added 
that no staff should be offered to the Liberian 
government which is composed of nationals 
from countries neighbors of Liberia, and 
that the members of the two investigating 
commissions should also be excluded. 

In its formal reply to the Brunot report on 
April 27, 1932, the Liberian government, 
after reiterating that reforms had been 
made, declared that there were a sufficient 
number of reputable citizens available to 
serve as administrators. While Liberia was 
willing to employ a few foreign assistants, 
“it was never contemplated by the Govern¬ 
ment that proposals would be made to sub¬ 
stitute the native organization wholly by 
foreigners, nor to withdraw its native popu¬ 
lation from under direct administration of 
Liberians and place them entirely under the 
direction of an alien race. . . To carry out 
the suggestion of the Brunot Commission ... 
would not only rob qualified citizens of a na¬ 
tural right to effectively participate in the 
Government of the Provinces, but would 
destroy the fealty which the population now 
displays toward the Government of the Re¬ 
public; and would also work against the 
ideal of a homogeneous people.” The Li¬ 
berian government offered, however, to ap¬ 
point for five years three provincial com¬ 
missioners recommended by the League. 
While they would be responsible to the Secre¬ 
tary of the Interior, copies of their reports 
would be furnished to the League. The gov¬ 
ernment proposed that the five financial of¬ 
ficials under the 1926 contract remain, un¬ 
less the number could be reduced by agree¬ 
ment, and that a director of health and 
sanitation be appointed—making a total of 
nine foreign officials instead of twenty as 
in the Brunot report. The government de¬ 
clared that it could not accept recommenda¬ 
tions concerning the courts, since the judicial 
system was a “matter of purely internal pol¬ 
icy.”" Moreover it now opposed a new loan, 


5-1. League of Nations, Minutes of the 6th to 10th Sessions, 
January 1932. 

65 League of Nations, Letter of August 8, 1931, communi¬ 
cated to the Council May 19, 1932, C.476.1932.VII.,C./Liberia/3i. 

56. League of Nations, Memorandum of the Government of 
Liberia on the Report of the Experts, C./Liberia/13., April 
29, 1932. 


which would mean the “financial ruin” of 
the Republic. 

PLAN OF THE 
LEAGUE COMMITTEE 

In considering the Brunot report and Li¬ 
beria’s counter-proposal, the League com¬ 
mittee was confronted with three main ques¬ 
tions : the number and status of foreign offi¬ 
cials sent to Liberia; the question of a new 
loan; and modification of the Firestone con¬ 
tracts. The committee made it clear from 
the outset that the League would not attempt 
to enforce any recommendations on Liberia 
but that, on the other hand, if Liberia de¬ 
sired assistance, the League must obtain 
satisfactory assurances that such assistance 
would be effective. As Lord Cecil, chairman 
of the Council committee, declared, the 
League would be “in a quite impossible posi¬ 
tion unless it could be certain that its advice 
would be followed.”" Moreover, the scope of 
any reconstruction plan would depend on 
whether Liberia contracted a new loan. 
Theoretically, it was possible for the League 
to guarantee a loan similar to those guar¬ 
anteed to Austria and Hungary. Actually, 
however, this plan w T as not considered," 
apparently because of the unsatisfactory 
state of the world bond market, and the 
belief that reconstruction loans had proved 
a delusion in the past. Although the 
Brunot committee recommended that the 
Firestone interests issue the second half 
of the 1926 loan, members of the Coun¬ 
cil committee pointed out that this 
might strengthen the hold of the com¬ 
pany." During the discussion M. Ligthart, 
the Dutch expert, frankly declared that it 
was “unfortunate” that the Liberian govern¬ 
ment had granted the Firestone concessions. 
Since Liberia had a scanty population, “all 
the labour employed by the plantation repre¬ 
sented a dead loss to native growers who had 
need of it. Obviously it would be better, 
for the normal development of Liberia, for 
the Firestone Company to leave the coun¬ 
try, but that was impossible as the contract 
with that company had been concluded for 
a period of 99 years.”*’ Liberia could “do 
nothing without the Firestone Company.” 
M. Madariaga, the representative of Spain, 
declared that “the ideal solution” would be 
for the League to say that the present situa¬ 
tion concerning the Firestone company was 
“a bad one and should be radically changed,” 


57. League of Nations, Minutes of the 10th Meeting, Council 
Committee, January 29, 1932. 

58. Cf. remarks of Lord Cecil. Minutes of the 8th Meeting, 
January 27, 1932. 

59. Cf. ibid.. Minutes of the 10th Meeting, January 29, 1932, 
C./Liberia/P.V.lO. 

60. League of Nations, Minutes of the 8th Mectitig, Com¬ 
mittee of the Council, January 26, 1932, C./Llberla/P.V'.G 1 . 











August 3, 1932 


131 


but that was not practicable. What should 
be done was “to try by negotiations to get the 
Firestone Company to adapt itself to the 
labour and social conditions of the coun¬ 
try. . . What was the good of borrowing 
money for Liberia, if the League found it¬ 
self forced in its turn to dissimulate the fact 
that the existence in such a country of the 
Firestone Company’s plantations was per¬ 
nicious to the population ?”“ In the com¬ 
mittee’s second report to the Council,® it was 
stated that “in the opinion of certain mem¬ 
bers of the Committee the coexistence in 
Liberia of a weak State and a powerful for¬ 
eign undertaking gives rise to disadvan¬ 
tages . . .” These members consider it to be 
“indispensable that the rate of development 
of the plantations should be adapted to the 
economic and social conditions of Liberia,” 
and that the financial burden of the loan 
should be reduced. Other members “felt 
that it would be better to suspend judgment 
on this or any other question until the next 
session . . .” The Committee understood, 
moreover, that “the Firestone Company is 
prepared to give the utmost consideration 
to the general interests of Liberia, and that, 
as regards its policy in general as affecting 
the welfare of the aboriginal population, 
the company would be willing to be guided 
by the best opinion.” 

Proposed revision of 
Firestone contracts 

In its report of May 1932 the Council 
committee declared that it could not recom¬ 
mend a new loan to a country “already so 
encumbered” as Liberia. It believed, how¬ 
ever, that a moderate program of reforms 
could be carried from the present current 
resources of the government, plus the un¬ 
expended balance of the 1926 loan, amount¬ 
ing to $247,000, and a moratorium. It recom¬ 
mended that until the annual revenues of 
Liberia reached $650,000 a moratorium 
should be granted the government on the 
service of the 1926 loan, and that after ex¬ 
piration of the moratorium there should be 
a reduction in interest charges. It also rec¬ 
ommended that the size of the Firestone 
concession be reduced and the rental in¬ 
creased from 6 to about 50 cents an acre. 
It asked that negotiations should take place 
between the Liberian government, assisted 
by League experts, and the Firestone inter¬ 
ests. From the point of view of administra¬ 
tive reconstruction, the committee recom¬ 
mended that Liberia be divided into three 
provinces, each administered by a Provincial 
and Deputy Commissioner who would be 


61. League of Nations, Minutes oj the 11th Meeting , January 
30, 1932 ; cf. also M. Madariaga’s remarks in the Council, 
Official Journal, March 1932, p. 527. 

62. League of Nations, Official Journal, March 1932, p. 523. 


responsible to the Liberian president through 
the Secretary of the Interior. The Mon¬ 
rovia government should agree to appoint 
these six commissioners nominated by the 
League of Nations. These commissioners 
“may be replaced for adequate reasons with 
the consent of the League of Nations.” The 
Liberia government should engage also two 
medical officers upon the same terms as the 
other experts and should continue to ap¬ 
point the five financial officials under the 
1926 loan contract. Thus the League plan 
calls for thirteen foreigners to serve as Li¬ 
berian officials, in contrast to the twenty pro¬ 
posed by the Brunot report and the nine 
proposed by Liberia." 

The Provincial Commissioner is charged 
with the duty of enforcing the laws and 
maintaining peace and order. It is not clear 
whether the powers of the Financial Adviser 
are to be restricted by the terms of the 1926 
loan contract, or whether they are to be 
more extensive. The League project merely 
states that the Financial Adviser shall have 
all the powers necessary to insure the effi¬ 
cient functioning of Liberia’s fiscal services, 
and the right of supervision over all financial 
questions—particularly to make sure that 
the credits allocated are being judicially ap¬ 
plied for the purposes stipulated. 

Appointment of a 
Chief Adviser 

During the committee’s discussion the 
necessity was pointed out of having a uni¬ 
fied control so that the work of the different 
foreign officials might not be dissipated. In 
order to achieve this end and to maintain the 
authority of the League, the committee’s 
plan calls for the appointment by the League, 
with the acceptance of the President of Li¬ 
beria, of a Chief Adviser." “This Adviser 
shall be responsible to and removable by the 
League, and shall be attached to the Central 
Government in order to give it the benefit of 
his advice, to co-ordinate the work of the 
foreign experts, and to supervise the execu¬ 
tion of the scheme of assistance. For this 
purpose, the Liberian Government shall 
grant him all facilities for the performance 
of his duties throughout his term of office. 
The Chief Adviser may, in particular, ask 
for any documents and official reports he 
may require, and may make such investiga- 


63. Professor Henri Labouret declares that '‘France, a neigh¬ 
bor of Liberia who suffers more than all the neighboring 
colonies from the trouble and insecurity ruling in the Internal 
provinces of the Black Republic,” and which is the second 
colonial power in the world, should be represented among the 
foreign officials. ( L*Afrique Fran^aise, June 1932, p. 328.) 
Liberia, however, has indicated an unwillingness to accept either 
British or French advisers. Cf. p. 130. 

64. The Chief Adviser is to receive a salary of $12,000, pre¬ 
sumably paid by the League, in comparison with $12,500 paid 
to the American Financial Adviser: the Provincial Commission¬ 
ers are to receive $8,000, and the Assistant Commissioners, 
$6,000, paid by the Liberian government. 






132 


The Reconstruction of Liberia 


tions as he may think fit in the country.” 
Any disagreement between the Liberian gov¬ 
ernment and the Financial Adviser shall be 
arbitrated by the Chief Adviser. Moreover, 
“should the Chief Adviser find that there has 
been negligence in the application of the 
scheme he shall so inform the Government 
and shall advise what steps shall be taken; 
should his advice have no effect he shall make 
recommendations to the Government in 
writing, and should his written recommen¬ 
dations not be followed he may submit the 
question to the Council of the League of 
Nations.” 

If the Liberian government refuses to 
carry out the Council’s recommendations, the 
Council may declare that the agreement has 
lapsed and that consequently the modifica¬ 
tions introduced into the loan contract with 
the American Finance Corporation are no 
longer binding on that company. In all such 
cases the Council shall decide by a unani¬ 
mous vote, Liberia’s vote not counting in 
reckoning unanimity. In urgent cases the 
President of the Council may act on behalf 
of the Council, provided that he refers the 
matter to the Council as soon as possible. 
The plan should come to an end after a 
period of five years, unless the Liberian gov¬ 
ernment intimates its desire that it continue. 
Before the expiration of that period, the 
League may discontinue its cooperation if 
it thinks fit. At its session of May 1932 the 
League Council adopted a report asking that 
if the Liberian government accepted the 
principle of the committee’s plan, negotia¬ 
tions concerning its adoption should take 
place in August between the Monrovia gov¬ 
ernment and the Council Committee, assisted 
by the Financial and Health Organizations 
of the League. The final result should be con¬ 
firmed at the September session of the 
Council." 

CRITICISM OF THE 
LEAGUE PROPOSAL 

In a communication released in Geneva on 
May 18, 1932 the United States declared 
that in its opinion “conditions in Liberia 
have now grown so chaotic, and adequate au¬ 
thority has become so demoralized that it is 
doubtful whether an effective government 
exists in the country.” The assistance of 
Liberia was “rightly a matter of interna¬ 
tional concern which should be solved 
through sustained international cooperation. 
The American Government would be deeply 
disappointed if there were a suspension of 
the present negotiations” and it accordingly 
suggested that a subcommittee be appointed, 
on which it would be glad to be represented, 


65. According to Secretary of the Treasury Gabriel Dennis, 
the Liberian legislature was considering - the League proposal in 
July 1932. Afro-American. July 16, 1932. 


to remain in session until a plan had been 
worked'out. “In the event, however, that 
the Liberian problem is left from now until 
next autumn without solution and without 
a continuing means of international coopera¬ 
tion to deal with it, the American Govern¬ 
ment would find it necessary to reserve its 
position and its full liberty of action.”" 

American reservation 

Moreover, in a reservation to the report 
of the Liberia Committee adopted by the ‘ 
Council on May 20, the United States ex¬ 
pressed the belief that 

. . the delegation of adequate authority by 
Liberia to a single official of an international 
agency would be the most genuinely practical 
solution of the problem. This would leave the de¬ 
tails of a program of complete rehabilitation to be 
put into effect step by step and on a self-support¬ 
ing basis and would take advantage of all exist¬ 
ing machinery. . . The American Government 
would, however, be prepared to study a proposal 
involving more initial changes in Liberian or¬ 
ganization and consequently much greater initial 
expense provided it were clearly understood that 
there would be the requisite delegation of author¬ 
ity by Liberia as an indispensable preliminary to 
any adjustment of the present financial situation. 
In the light of the above the American Govern¬ 
ment would not be willing to recommend to the 
Finance Corporation, which is the interested 
party, any financial negotiations until a satis¬ 
factory administrative plan has been agreed to 
by Liberia. The foregoing constitutes a full 
reservation of the position of the American Gov¬ 
ernment on the points mentioned. It is based 
upon many years of experience in endeavoring 
to induce the governing elements in Liberia to 
improve the conditions of the country through 
'advisers’ and upon the conviction that no plan 
can succeed unless it is founded upon principles 
which will insure its practicability.”® 7 

It is not known therefore whether the United 
States will veto the present League proposal. 

At the other extreme, the League plan is 
criticized on the ground that it does not im¬ 
pose adequate responsibility on Liberians. 
It is argued that if foreigners go to Liberia 
to administer rather than advise, the same 
error that the United States is alleged to 
have committed in Haiti and Nicaragua may 
occur—namely, that of doing things for Li¬ 
beria rather than teaching Liberians to do 
things for themselves. In reply to the Amer¬ 
ican criticism of the adviser system, it is 
asserted that the system applied in Liberia 
in the past was irresponsible, and that few 
first-class advisers were sent. 68 The develop¬ 
ment of Liberia, it is argued, can best be 
advanced by winning the confidence and 
good-will of the Liberians, rather than by 
pressing the Monrovia government to accept 


66. League of Nations, C./Liberia/20, May 18. 1932. 

67. TJ. S. State Department, Press Releases, May 21, 1932, 
p. 515. 

68. For a criticism of one American Financial Adviser, cf. 

p. 123. Cf. also remarks of Viscount Cecil, March 16, 1932. 
Parliamentary Debates, Lords, Vol. 83. p. 929 ; Secretary of 
State Grimes. Minutes of the 10th Meeting, Committee of the 
Council, January 29, 1932; and Secretary of the Treasury 

Gabriel Dennis, Afro-American, July 2, 1932. 










August 3, 1932 


133 


foreign officials with power to impose de¬ 
cisions. In reply to this criticism, defenders 
of the League plan assert that during a tran¬ 
sitional state the officials recommended by 
the Council must have real power, otherwise 
a condition of chaos will continue. As the 
plan develops, more and more authority will 
be delegated to Liberian administrators. It 
is pointed out that, since the World War, 
Germany, Austria and Hungary have dele¬ 
gated extensive powers to foreign officials 
for reconstruction purposes. 

The League plan is also criticized on the 
ground that, following the proposal of the 
Liberian government, it would allow the 
United States to continue to nominate five 
financial officials, leaving the other six to be 
nominated by the League. It is argued that 
five financial officials is an unnecessarily 
large number, and that the division of 
responsibility between the League and the 
United States may lead to conflict. In reply, 
it is stated that so long as the League Ad¬ 
viser may arbitrate disputes between the 
Financial Adviser and the Liberian govern¬ 
ment, and so long as the United States con¬ 
tinues to be represented on the League’s Li¬ 
beria Committee, the likelihood of conflict 
is reduced. 

THE POSSIBILITY OF 
INTERVENTION 

Should the Liberia government and the 
League fail to reach an agreement in August, 
such alternatives as revolution and in¬ 
tervention remain. Dr. Brunot, the French 
expert, declares that Liberian natives in¬ 
formed him that they “would not hesitate to 
revolt against the Libero-Americans” in case 
assistance from the League was not forth¬ 
coming.® Deprived of funds with which to 
purchase munitions, the Monrovia govern¬ 
ment might be overthrown, especially if na¬ 
tive tribes were able to run into the country 
arms from the neighboring French and 
British colonies. Should the hinterland “na¬ 
tives” overturn the Monrovia government, 
they might consent to the establishment of a 
League mandate or to a division of Liberia 
between France and England. 

Under international law intervention for 
humanitarian purposes, epecially if it is joint 
rather than unilateral, is supported by many 
authorities. 70 That the League has any power 
to intervene in the internal affairs of Liberia 
has been denied, however, by the represen¬ 
tatives of Liberia, Panama, Venezuela and 
Great Britain. Moreover, M. Zaleski of 
Poland, the Council rapporteur on Liberia, 


69. League of Nations, Minutes of the 7th Meeting, Com¬ 
mittee of the Council, January 26, 1932. Cf. also La Supplique 
du Liberia, cited. 

70. For a summary, cf. P. Fauchille, Traitc de Droit Inter¬ 
national Public, 8th ed. (Paris), Vol. I, Part I, p. 658 et seq. 


has declared that the League “had never had 
any idea of infringing upon the independence 
of a State Member of the League.” 71 Accord¬ 
ing to some students, this view of the 
League’s competence is too restricted. The 
League cannot expect, it is argued, to pre¬ 
vent a great power from resorting to self- 
help, as in the case of Japan against China, 
unless it is willing to organize intervention 
in a state which demonstrates incapacity for 
fulfilling its obligations which, in the case 
of Liberia, include those defined by the Anti- 
Slavery Convention of 1926, the Forced La¬ 
bor Convention of 1930 and Article 23 of 
the League Covenant providing for “just 
treatment of the native inhabitants of terri¬ 
tories” under the control of a member state. 

Assuming the correctness of the view that 
the League could not itself organize an in¬ 
tervention in Liberia, does it follow that a 
single power may undertake such an inter¬ 
vention? Will France and Great Britain 
long remain indifferent to the alleged 
existence of yellow fever in Liberia and the 
disaffection of its native tribes? Will the 
United States, in view of its historic rela¬ 
tionship to Liberia and the Firestone invest¬ 
ments, intervene if the League negotia¬ 
tions fail? Although the State Department 
has declared that it does not wish to assume 
any exclusive African responsibilities, its 
note of May 18 reserving full freedom of ac¬ 
tion is interpreted in some quarters as a 
threat of intervention.” Finally, would the 
League of Nations consent to unilateral in¬ 
tervention in Liberia, whose political inde¬ 
pendence is guaranteed by the League, any 
more than it has consented to the recent in¬ 
tervention of Japan in China? Even though 
the League does not itself organize an inter¬ 
vention, may it legally authorize a single 
power to undertake such intervention on be¬ 
half of humanitarian or international prin¬ 
ciples? May a state be expelled from the 
League, and thereby deprived of the protec¬ 
tion of Article 10 of the Covenant? Accord¬ 
ing to the last paragraph of Article 16: “Any 
member of the League which has violated 
any covenant of the League may be declared 
to be no longer a Member of the League. . .” 
Does this mean that the League may expel 
Liberia for not fulfilling its general treaty 
obligations, or maintaining a certain mini¬ 
mum standard of order and justice? These 
questions will remain academic if the League 
and Liberia reach an agreement upon a re¬ 
construction program. 


71. League of Nations, Official Journal, July 1931, p. 1119, 

1122; ibid., March 1932, p. 527. For other non-intervention 
statements, cf. Minutes of the 11th and 12th Meetings, Com¬ 
mittee of the Council, January 29 and February 1, 1932 ; for 
Viscount Cecil's view that the League has no power of inter¬ 
vention, cf. Parliamentary Debates, Lords, March 16, 1932, 

p. 930; also C./67th Session/P.V.6 1 . 

72. Cf. editorial, "An Appeal to Liberia,” The Nation, July 
27, 1932. 






134 


The Reconstruction of Liberia 


CONCLUSION 


Although admitting that Liberians are 
largely responsible for the present plight of 
their country and that the government is in 
drastic need of foreign assistance, a number 
of observers fear that the world may be too 
harsh in its judgments. To a certain extent, 
the present condition of Liberia is due to the 
attitude of foreign powers which have been 
unsympathetic to the idea of an independent 
Negro republic. Moreover, the United 
States, while protecting Liberia from ag¬ 
gression, has done little to assist the coun¬ 
try in its internal development. Following 
the publication of the Christy report, one 
writer declared: 

“Despite the nresenee of American officials ap¬ 
pointed by the State Department under the 1912 
and 1926 loan agreements, despite the presence 
of American diplomatic officers and the Firestone 
managers, slavery and forced labor have flour¬ 
ished throughout the country. The report of the 
International Commission states that some of the 
worst abuses have been committed by the Frontier 
Force—a body supposedly under American con¬ 
trol. The present state of affairs in Liberia is 
thus a reflection upon the Liberian policy of the 
United States.” 73 

The situation was not due to personal in¬ 
competence so much as to a general policy 
of shielding Liberia from the world without 
securing adequate guarantees that Liberia 
would not abuse its independence. 74 A num¬ 
ber of Liberians believe that the United 
States took unfair advantage of its special 
position to induce President King to accept 
the 1926 concessions which League of Na¬ 
tions experts have since pronounced onerous. 

Secondly, it is declared that the world is 
in danger of applying to Liberia standards 
which it does not itself observe. Few crit¬ 
icisms seem to have been made of the fact 
that white men in the French Congo and in 
Spanish Fernando Po profited as much from 
the export of labor as did Liberian officials. 
Moreover, atrocities have frequently oc- 


73. R. L. Buell, “The Liberian Paradox/' Virginia Quarterly 
Review, April 1931. 

74. Many Liberians were Irritated by the fact that the 
Firestone company employed former President King as counsel 
in the Davidson case. This was a suit brought by a former 
Firestone employee against the company. Liberians charge 
that the Firestone interests attempted to prevent the case from 
coming before the Liberian courts. The Firestone interests de¬ 
clare, however, that the court exhibited gross partiality in 
hearing this case. The Davidson suit is pending before the 
Supreme Court. 

75. Cf. the incidents of the Congo Free State and the French 
Congo, the Cocoa Islands, Putumayo—all before the World 
War; the American caco war in Haiti in 1918; the "massacre" 
of Amritsar in India in 1919; the French bombardment of 
Damascus in 1925 ; and the Ross report on labor in Portuguese 
Africa in 1925. M. Madariaga of Spain declared at a meeting 
of the League Council that the Christy report “had obviously 
been prepared by men of undoubted honesty and good will, but 
it showed a lack of perspective, and, for that reason, was to 
some extent wanting in objectivity." League of Nations, Offi¬ 
cial Journal, March 1932, p. 526. 


curred in territory under European and 
American rule, but in no case have such 
atrocities been followed by the establishment 
of international control. 75 Moreover, while 
professing to be shocked at the existence of 
forced labor in Liberia, humanitarian opin¬ 
ion has not been strong enough to induce 
many governments holding colonies to ratify 
the draft convention on forced labor adopted 
by the International Labour Office on June 
28, 1930. Although the powers represented 
on the League Council apparently induced 
Liberia to ratify this convention, the only 
other states which appear to have ratified 
this agreement are Great Britain, Australia, 
the Irish Free State, Sweden and Denmark. 7 * 
Of this group, Great Britain is the only large 
colonial power. Should the League attempt 
to bring pressure upon Liberia to prohibit 
forced labor when the leading members of 
the League fail to undertake such obliga¬ 
tions? While not attempting to defend such 
a discrimination, some observers assert nev¬ 
ertheless that if Liberia adopts high stand¬ 
ards of native administration with the assist¬ 
ance of the League, the great colonial powers 
will irresistably be forced to adopt these 
standards. 

Finally, it is alleged that the world tends 
to exaggerate conditions in Liberia. The 
charges made last March that many innocent 
Krus had been “massacred” by way of re¬ 
prisal are cited as an example. Investiga¬ 
tion showed that while the condition on the 
Kru coast was serious, its causes were rad¬ 
ically different from those which had been 
represented. 77 

Some Liberians declare that foreign ap¬ 
prehension over yellow fever has been stimu¬ 
lated partly for political reasons and that 
health conditions in the country are much 
better than represented by outside investiga¬ 
tors. Finally, to show that the African na¬ 
tive tribes are not as antagonistic to Liberian 
authority as foreigners have represented, 
the Liberians cite the statement of a Liberi¬ 
an district commissioner on June 10, 1932, 
declaring that as a result of a riot in the 
British colony of Sierra Leone 200 natives 
crossed the Liberian border for refuge, many 
of them in a pitiable condition. They 
charged oppressive treatment on the part of 
certain chiefs and improper conduct by a 
British district commissioner. 


76. League of Nations, Official Journal, April 1931, p. 674; 
June 1931, p. 942 ; August 1931, p. 1545 ; February 1932, p. 282. 

77. Cf. Ben M. Azikiwe. “In Defense of Liberia,” Journal of 
Negro History , January 1932 ; also N. H. B. Cassell, “Liberia 
Defended by a Liberian," Current History, September 1931.